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 AFRICAN SAGE PHILOSOPHY AND SOCRATES:  MIDWIFERY AND METHOD 
 Gail M. Presbey, University of Detroit Mercy 
 
I. BACKGROUND: SEEKING AFRICA’S PHILOSOPHICAL VOICE 
Considering the general lack of written sources for much of sub-Saharan Africa, how 
does one proceed if one is intent on collecting a tradition of African philosophical ideas that 
have not been influenced by Anglo-European thought?  One way is to turn to the fruits of a long 
oral tradition, by mining the wisdom of the elders of this century, and by committing to writing 
the philosophical concepts and ideas handed down in this way.  This idea was first attempted by 
a European missionary, Placide Tempels, who wrote Bantu Philosophy.  Critical reviews of 
Tempels' method, dubbed "ethnophilosophy," abound.  For example, H. Odera Oruka notes that 
Tempels and other ethnophilosophers, in their zeal to represent traditional cultures, appointed 
themselves as spokespersons and "philosophicated" on behalf of the cultures, instead of letting 
the people speak for themselves.1  
Some African philosophers, like Professor Peter Bodunrin, want to agree with European 
critics of African philosophy, and admit that African philosophy is getting a "late start" in 
comparison with European philosophies.  After all, there have not yet been organized systemic 
philosophical reflections by Africans themselves.  H. Odera Oruka, however, is not content to 
give in so easily, but he agrees that there has not been "organized, systematized reflections."  
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Oruka's concern is that the Europeans are denying more than just that- they are denying that 
Africans have a practice of the critical use of reason.  And so Oruka is intent on showing that the 
practice of critically evaluating received beliefs and traditions is, and has been, alive and well in 
Africa (TCAP 44-45). 
Although there have not been many sub-Saharan philosophical texts, it does not follow 
that there has been no philosophy.  One need only point out that Socrates never wrote anything to 
prove the point that there can be philosophers without written texts.  Of course, we today would 
probably know little of Socrates if Plato hadn't written about him.  There appear to have been 
centuries of an oral tradition of philosophical thought in Africa, passed from generation to 
generation, but we are without records to prove its existence.  Of course, speculating on this 
likelihood is not the same as proving it to have been so.2   
Many thinkers have lately been engaged in searching out the present generation of 
African wise men in order to record the accumulated wisdom of centuries.  There are presently, 
to simplify, two related approaches.  The first tries to find the commonalities between the ideas 
of members of the same ethnic group, and includes these findings with other related sources, 
such as language analysis and the study of oral literature.  The other (the focus of this paper) 
emphasizes the distinct and personal ideas of individuals from a variety of ethnic groups.   
II. SAGE PHILOSOPHY: A MORE PROMISING APPROACH 
H. Odera Oruka (deceased December 1995), a professor of philosophy at University of 
Nairobi, suggested a method, called "sage philosophy," for which he deserves the title of 
founder.  Sage philosophy tries to record the wisdom and beliefs of individual East African 
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thinkers with sensitivity and accuracy not present in the earlier attempts.  Since then some West 
African philosophers (for example, Anthony Oseghare of Obafemi Awolowo University in 
Nigeria) have been interested in the method as well.3  Oruka claimed that sage philosophy is 
unlike the ethnophilosophy of Tempels, Mbiti, Ruch, Anywanyu, and others, in that it 
concentrates on the debate of philosophical ideas, and is not an anthropological study of any 
group's beliefs (TCAP 24).  Oruka himself did not attempt to categorize or systematize a 
philosophical worldview of an entire culture in his own words, but rather, he encouraged sages to 
speak for themselves and then published the dialogues he had with them.  His book, Sage 
Philosophy:  Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy,4 contains 
interviews of sages from several ethnic groups found in Kenya, and so does not attempt to be an 
exhaustive account of any one group's philosophy. 
A. Personal Thought, Not Groupthink 
Oruka emphasizes the ideas of unique and wise individuals, to show that critical thinking 
is a tradition in Africa. He is concerned that outsiders could misjudge African traditional 
communities by imagining that they are static and homogeneous or engaged in a kind of 
groupthink.  Anthropologists reinforce this idea by interviewing many thinkers and then 
reporting only the common aspects of the diverse accounts.  Ethnophilosophy practiced in Africa 
implicitly claims "that traditional Africa is a place of philosophical unanimity allowing no room 
whatsoever for a Socrates or Descartes (SP 1,19).”    
Anthony Oseghare, an admirer of Oruka's sage philosophy method, is perhaps more 
zealous than Oruka himself. While clearly casting his allegiance with philosophy based in 
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culture rather than universal notions, he still states that philosophy is "not concerned with 
consensus or cozy unanimity of opinions."  In fact, he insists that "a proper philosophical method 
cannot be arrived at through a simple matter of `counting noses,' since this will leave things only 
at the communal level and philosophy is personal, i.e., a second-order activity" (SAP 97, 
emphasis in the original).  According to his criteria, the work of Barry Hallen and Joseph Sodipo 
on Yoruba epistemology (based on interviews of "Onisegun" or masters of traditional medicine) 
is "incoherent" because, among other reasons, "it contains not a single example of individual 
philosophizing" (SAP 101, emphasis in the original).  He therefore concludes that Oruka's 
methodology of gathering from the sages "their individual ratiocinative thoughts" holds the 
brightest future for building an African philosophy (SAP 101).  
B. Method: Interview With A Sage 
The methods of interviewing in sage philosophy are as follows.  An academic 
philosopher (professionally trained in Western traditions of philosophy) from an African 
university, goes into rural areas, and asks villagers to single out someone considered "wise" in 
their community.  Then, if the selected “sage” agrees, an interview commences, with the trained 
philosopher asking a series of questions, but being flexible enough to let the sage respond 
comfortably and affect the direction of the conversation.   
In the interview, the trained professional philosopher tries not to impose any ideas on the 
person interviewed.  It is the sage's philosophical views that are mainly to be recorded (as much 
as possible uncontaminated by the interviewer).  Such a careful procedure is important to protect 
the method from charges that the interviewers are just putting ideas into people's heads.  Since 
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he wants to make a historical point, Oruka is not interested here in proving that he can 
philosophize.  However, Oruka  does describe the interview as a dialogue where even the 
academic philosopher's own views on the world may be challenged and modified.  Oruka looked 
particularly for those sages who had not had extensive formal schooling and those who practiced 
traditional African views rather than missionary religions, in order (so far as possible) to collect 
a sample of explicitly "traditional" African thought, and not Western-influenced derivatives.   
C. Critical Doubts: A Tainted Method? 
Oruka seems concerned not to "taint" or "distort" the "sample" in a scientific sense.  Of 
course, if Heisenberg's principle holds in conversation as well as in scientific experiments, 
Oruka's mere presence (let alone his presence as active questioner) might affect the sage's 
philosophy (or his expression of it).  When studying the interviews, one cannot help but doubt on 
occasion that the sages would have explained their views so thoroughly without the occasional 
"devil's advocate" prodding by the interviewers.  In fact, this is a purposeful part of Oruka's 
method.  As he specifies, when a sage makes a presumably wise statement, the sage should be 
challenged to justify it.  If the sage has a philosophic frame of mind, he or she will be able to 
give a defense.  If not, the sage may give an unimpressive answer, or may refuse a response 
altogether.  Further provocations from the interviewer may entail offering alternative arguments 
to the sage's position.  Both sage and interviewer may end up with a changed view on the topic 
(TCAP 54-5; SP 35).   
III. SOCRATIC PARALLELS IN ORUKA’S METHOD 
Critics like Peter Bodunrin jump at signs of the interviewer's activity to proclaim that the 
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results have indeed been shaped by Western philosophy through the background training of the 
interviewer.  Oruka's continued insistence that it is the sages who philosophize, and not himself, 
should remind us of the role of Socrates.  Socrates insists in the Theaetetus, for example, that he 
has not put ideas into the youth's head, but instead is merely helping in the birth of thought in a 
man pregnant with ideas.  Just as midwives are too old to bear children, but have the necessary 
experience and knowledge to aid young women with the birthing of children, so Socrates 
suggests that he has no wisdom himself, but is only interested in encouraging the birth of ideas 
in others, and then testing those ideas to see if they are viable.5  
Of course one could question the possibility, and appropriateness, of comparing African 
sage philosophy with ancient Greek philosophy.  Are there not pitfalls, and plenty of mistakes to 
be made, when one attempts to draw significant parallels between the philosophies of different 
cultures and times?  In this case, the precedent for comparison is found in the works of Oruka 
himself.  Significantly, Oruka has argued that the methods of reason are universally applicable, 
and are not culture-bound.  One should not conclude that the use of the philosophic method, 
based on reason, is legitimate only for the Euro-American world.   
In an early article of his entitled "On Philosophy and Humanism in Africa," Oruka 
describes what he sees as the role and method of universally valid philosophical reasoning in an 
African context.  African philosophers, he suggests, must "create a critical and dialectical 
philosophy" that has as its goal to "safeguard and promote the value of human life and 
discourage the prevailing and impending inhuman practices in the [African] Continent."6  The 
bulk of Oruka's paper describes the fictional but representative country of ARID (African 
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Republic of Inhumanity and Death) and the moral cause of its problems.  His advocacy of the 
need for "free thinking" in such a repressive context, by philosophers devoted to the Good of 
their society, parallels Socrates's stated devotion to the moral integrity of Athens.7 
I believe Oruka must have had Socrates in mind when he devised his method of 
questioning the wise sages of Kenya.  Oruka described his own method as "sagacious didactics," 
because it involved going endlessly through twists and turns, challenges and preconceptions, in 
the course of a question-and-answer session with a Kenyan sage.  Oruka states that "the role of 
the interviewer is to act as the provocateur to the sage.  The interviewer is to help the sage give 
birth to his full views on the subject under consideration (SP 36, italics in original).”   In this 
metaphor, the professional philosopher takes on the role of Socrates and questions the wise 
elders of Kenya in much the same way that Socrates questioned the wise men of Athens.  This 
same notion of the interviewer as active provocateur is echoed by Anthony Oseghare, who is also 
enthusiastic about the method  (SAP 102). 
Emphasizing the special nature of philosophy, Oruka states that the philosopher's work 
entails a particular process.  Firstly, it should "apply critical analytical reason to the prevailing 
social and moral order and place this order in an historical context."   It is important when 
cataloguing to sort out the humanizing principles from the dehumanizing ones.  In other words, 
not all of the tradition is good.  Later, the philosopher should subject possible ideals to "the test 
and analysis of dialectical reason."8 The ultimate goal is providing a moral foundation for 
society. 
Through his practice of sage philosophy, Oruka intends to shake up parts of the world 
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beyond the borders of any one African country or community, and become a gadfly of universal 
significance, as Socrates became.  Oruka and followers are trying to sting the Eurocentric 
philosophical world into waking up to philosophies of traditional African origin.  Given these 
considerations, I believe there are interesting and important parallels between sage philosophy 
and both the "gadfly" and "midwife" techniques of Socrates.  The gadfly aspect has to do with 
the social role that the philosopher plays regarding the moral integrity of the community.  Oruka 
fills this role regarding two communities.  He "shakes up" and "challenges" the rural 
communities to take seriously the thought of individual and critical dissenters within their own 
community; but he also challenges members of his own university community in Kenya as well 
as an international audience of philosophy scholars so that they will own up to the narrowness of 
the Eurocentric philosophical heritage.  
What about Oruka and other interviewers of sages as Socratic midwives?  In her article 
on Socrates' midwifery, Rinita Mazumdar notes three significant aspects of the midwife:  "1.  
She does not put the child into the mother's womb.  2.  She merely brings out the child. 3.  She 
tests the offspring to see if it is healthy or not."9  Oruka claims to follow all of these steps.  He 
claims that he has not put ideas into the sages' heads, but is rather recording their ideas.  And he 
speaks of the importance of rationally testing the ideas for viability and worth.   
Socrates, Oruka and other interviewers do not themselves claim to be entirely without 
wisdom or original ideas of their own. Because of the nature of their project, they choose to 
withhold their own ideas so as to focus on the ideas of those interviewed.  Interestingly enough, 
in his article "Philosophical Apology in the Theaetetus," Scott R. Hemmenway notes that Plato 
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has Socrates argue for his own lack of wisdom to protect himself from the possible anger 
Theaetetus might experience once Socrates has defeated one of his newborn ideas.  But 
Hemmenway notes that Theaetetus himself is mild-mannered; the person who is growing truly 
angry is Theodorus, who is witnessing the dialogue and thinks that it is of dubious merit.  
Theaetetus, on the other hand, is encouraged by Socrates' apologetic, and becomes inspired to 
venture another possible idea.10  Are there any parallels with Oruka's sage philosophy here?  The 
interviewer's reluctance to press his own ideas probably encourages the sage's cooperation in the 
interview process, and it is more likely that other academic philosophers, akin to Theodorus, are 
those most likely to be irritated by the whole project. 
    Oruka himself has a rebuttal for those who would suggest that the new ideas produced by 
his questioning of the sages must be attributed to himself rather than the sages.  He notes that 
British philosophers like Moore and Russell were responding to challenges in Hegel when they 
wrote the key points of their philosophies.  We consider Moore and Russell philosophers in their 
own right, and not just the "products" of Hegel.  Likewise, the interview may be the "occasion" 
in which sage philosophers are pressed to clarify their views, and defend their views with rigor; 
however, they still remain the authors of these ideas  (TCAP 43).   
Nevertheless, the method of interviewing that Oruka uses deserves careful scrutiny.  
After all, Hegel and Russell did not strictly "interview" each other.  D.A. Masolo notes that 
Russell formulated his philosophy from the legacy created and established by Hegel, and not 
from a person-to-person dialogue, thereby rendering Oruka's parallel inexact.11  
There may be some additional, unintended parallels to the Socratic example as well.  
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Socrates draws a contrast between the midwife, a woman, whose patients are women trying to 
give birth to a physical being, and himself, the male "midwife" of male patients who are giving 
birth to ideas.12  It is easy to recognize this as a stereotypical and traditional split between the 
roles of women and men.  Here the parallel with Oruka is implicit, perhaps even unconscious.  
Of the twelve sages interviewed in his book, eleven are men.  (There are an additional six men 
quoted in another chapter.)  The one woman interviewed had borne no children in her long life.  
Does Oruka agree with Socrates that one must turn to men to find those "pregnant with ideas"?  
This may be the result of Oruka's method, which entails relying on local people to lead the 
interviewer to a wise person.  The cultural connotations of "wise person" in the traditional 
Kenyan community may associate wisdom with elder males, although other cultures (for example 
the Yoruba) consider older women, particularly mothers past menopause, to be wise and 
spiritually powerful.13  Since the publication in 1991 of Sage Philosophy, Oruka has taken notice 
of the discrepancy between his statements about women's equality and his almost total exclusion 
of women sages from his book, and attempts are now being made at the University of Nairobi to 
interview more women.14 
IV. TAKING STOCK: HAS ORUKA’S PRACTICE OF SAGE PHILOSOPHY BEEN TRULY SOCRATIC?   
Is Oruka's method of interviewing based on the "field research" method of social 
scientists?  Or is it really based on Socratic dialogue?  Implicit in Oruka's defense of his method 
is the assertion that some new philosophizing is indeed coming about through these interviews.  
If that is so, and yet at the same time the sage is to be considered the author of the new ideas 
rather than the trained philosopher, then there ought to be something about the interviewing 
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dynamic that is akin to Socratic midwifery, the aiding in the birth of new ideas through 
questioning. 
A. Bodunrin’s Critique 
Peter Bodunrin, who argues that new ideas arise from the interview, seems nevertheless 
to want to make a case against Oruka's midwifery in the article that is included in the "critics" 
section of Oruka's book.15 Bodunrin suggests that Oruka is merely doing field research that is 
only marginally related to Socrates' practice of interviewing the wise people of Athens.  
Bodunrin does accept that interviewer and those being interviewed work together on producing 
what might emerge as a new insight. But he highlights the following contrasts:  Socrates's 
interlocutors were his intellectual peers; the Athenian agora was a speaker's corner, and so more 
akin to a conference center than a marketplace; Socrates was not satisfied with popular notions 
of philosophical concepts; and even though Socrates and others did not write down the 
interviews themselves, they were not illiterate but quite educated (SP 168-69). 
Bodunrin takes the parallel in regard to the birthing of new ideas as proving that African 
philosophy is still "in the making," a new discipline that is only just beginning.  The fact that 
communally recognized "wise persons" can philosophize, when prompted by pesky questioners 
with doubts and definitional demands, is not the same as saying that an autonomous tradition has 
existed over time.  Here Bodunrin is implicitly referring to Socrates's self-described role as a 
gadfly in Plato's Apology.  Who has been the gadfly in the African case?  Bodunrin proclaims 
that it was first the Westerner who came over and claimed that Africans were incapable of 
philosophizing.  Second, it was the African nationalist, who (along with rejecting Western 
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clothes and ideas) wanted African academic philosophers to stop teaching European philosophy  
(SP 164).  I want to note, however, that the traditional sages were not spurred to action by either 
of these gadflies.  Rather, it was the academically trained philosophers who felt the stings of 
these gadflies. Perhaps in seeking their own relief, they turn around and "stung" or questioned 
others, the traditional sages, in response to the skeptical questions of the Europeans and the 
African nationalists. 
On this point I agree with Bodunrin.  Oruka's method deviates from Socrates' method 
insofar as it is aimed at responding to the charges of closed-minded Euro-Americans.  This 
deviation shows itself in Oruka's reluctance to do what he says philosophy must do,  to 
rigorously test each idea of the tradition, to test it for viability, as the philosophical "midwife" 
does. 
Here I think it is interesting to contrast the difference between the occasional anger of the 
sages with the anger that Socrates sees as directed toward him when people become so angry 
they are ready to "bite" him.  For Socrates, the anger arises when he has just dialectically 
demolished a newborn idea.  He requests of Theaetetus, for instance, that if he should "take the 
abortion from you and cast it away, do not be savage with me like a woman robbed of her first 
child."16  By contrast, if the African sage becomes angry it is not because the interviewer has 
demolished his (or rarely, her) idea; in fact, the interviewer has been very polite and has not 
given any criticism.  Rather, the sage is sometimes angry at being asked the question in the first 
place.  It is, perhaps, a sense of social propriety that is outraged (TCAP 55). 
B. Folk vs. Philosophical Sages 
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Many of those interviewing the sages do not themselves agree with some (or many) of the 
aspects of the worldviews propounded in the traditions that they have so carefully recorded.  
Upon my questioning, Oruka admitted that he did not agree with many of his sages' comments on 
the inequality of the sexes, and that this aspect of tradition should be challenged.  In fact, Oruka 
has divided his sages into two categories.  He contrasts mere sages ("folk sages") with those who 
are both philosophers and sages ("philosophic sages").  "Folk sages" uncritically hold the views 
of their community; while "philosophic sages" are able to evaluate and criticize the tradition. 
Oruka clearly holds the second category as more advanced and cites a clear contrast between one 
sage who agreed with the beliefs of his community that women are inferior to men, and another 
who opposed this view.  He states unequivocally that the second has a sounder view because it is 
"critical" (TCAP 41). 
But the work of recording the ideas of folk sages merely to come to the conclusion that 
they were wrong in their thinking is of dubious benefit.  Oruka himself casts doubt on the 
philosophical nature of the folk sages' thought through the mere naming of them as "folk sages" 
in contrast to "philosophic sages."  He finds that folk sages hold the common views of their 
culture, and are often dogmatic in defending their philosophy and the structure of their society 
"with the zeal of the fanatical ideologists defending their political line."  This dogmatism and an 
inability to criticize the tradition disqualifies them as philosophers.  Oruka insists that even 
Ogotemmeli, (interviewed by Marcel Griaule and considered by many to be a wise man) is 
merely repeating Dogon tradition and shows no signs of having any new, independent thoughts.17 
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Oruka has devoted an entire section of his book, about twenty pages, to interviewing 
seven sages he himself has categorized as folk sages.  Could it be that the only reason Oruka 
includes the folk sages in his book is because of the contrast they provide with the philosophic 
sages, whom he seemingly wants to champion? 
C. Was Oruka Sufficiently Critical? 
Despite Oruka's general comments about the superiority of philosophical sages to folk 
sages, Oruka does not (either during or after interviews) provide his own analysis or critique of 
any of the particular claims the sages make.  This makes him vulnerable to the criticism of 
Ghanian philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, who argues that most African philosophers stop 
where he wants them to begin - with evaluating the traditional concepts and beliefs, and asking 
whether or not they are true.18 
It is interesting to contrast Oruka's "neutral" position as interviewer of sages with 
Socrates' role as "interviewer" of the wise men of Athens.  In Plato's Apology, Socrates asserts 
that when he began his cross-examination of those reputed to be the wisest men of Athens, he 
proceeded with an open mind, and did not know beforehand whether or not he would be 
convinced by their views and arguments. After questioning, however, he decided that they were 
not wise.  Socrates finds his own mission in life:  it is his role to show the "wise" for what they 
are—unknowing—and he considers that he has done a service to Athens each time he "exposes" 
the faulty views of any of its successful, well-respected members.  Of course, Meletus and others 
complain about Socrates's activity, charging that the youth of Athens will lose respect for their 
elders if Socrates persists.  Considering the diversity of ancient Athens, does one who loves 
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Greek culture applaud Socrates or resent him for criticizing the society that they love? 
I recounted this familiar account of Socrates to draw a contrast between Socrates's goal 
and at least one of Oruka's.  Socrates says his goal is to discover the truth, and he is willing to 
destroy his society's beliefs and to tear at the social fabric of its traditions, in pursuit of that 
greater goal.  But Oruka's expressed goal is to show forth the richness of African traditions.  He 
does not interview sages to see whether he can "dethrone" them.  In fact, we can't imagine Oruka 
saying, in a Socratic tone, "I have searched throughout rural Kenya, seeking out all men 
considered wise, and upon cross-examining them, I found all their wisdom to be lacking."  This 
makes Oruka's own criticisms of the sages problematic, however.  Because Oruka has said that 
the philosopher's goal is to provide a moral foundation for society, we expect at least some of the 
Socratic quest for truth.  Here we encounter some conflict in Oruka's goals.  In the tradition of 
philosophy, we expect Oruka to offer his criticisms. Yet because the critical pursuit of truth 
threatens to glorify his own intellectual prowess at the expense of glorifying wisdom in others, 
he willingly mutes his own criticisms.  Of course, he is trying to give the sages respect due to 
them but denied by Eurocentric models of progress and rationality.  But the issue of how and 
how much to criticize the traditional thinkers one is championing is a sensitive theme that runs 
throughout the works of many African philosophers.  
In fact, we might consider it ironic that, after Oruka has so greatly stressed the need for a 
critical component, he himself does not criticize the sages.  Within Oruka's edited collection on 
sage philosophy, Anthony Oseghare comments on two of the twelve sages included in the text,  
the philosophical sages John Mbuya and Oruka Rang'inya.  The other ten sages are presented in 
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the book without comment. Anthony Oseghare emphasizes the aspects of their thought which he 
finds valuable, and offers no criticisms (SP 156-160).  In fact, all of the articles gathered in part 
three of Oruka's book (entitled "Criticisms") are critical of Oruka's project of sage philosophy, 
and not of philosophical positions held by the sages.  It seems to me that while professional 
philosophers in Africa feel free to criticize each other's theories endlessly, most are reluctant to 
criticize the notions of the wise elders of their communities. 
Could it be the case that unchallenged sages have been flawless in their arguments?  Let 
me present one criticism in order to shed doubt on this hypothesis.  At the beginning of the 
interview, philosophic sage Oruka Rang'inya states that "God resides both in this world as well 
as in `heaven.'"  He explains, "God lives in the wind.  Thus, he is everywhere."  But he also 
insists that God is an "idea" and a "useful concept."  (SP 119)  There is some ambiguity here 
about God's nature.  Does God exist?  Is God spatially located, in the wind, and everywhere?  Or 
is God a "mere" idea?  The issue is further complicated when the sage later states that the very 
idea of heaven is fictitious and an illusion (SP 128).  This problematizes his earlier statement 
about God living both in this world and in heaven.  How can God live in a fiction?  Without 
further explanation, it looks as if Rang'inya is making contradictory claims. 
Another difficulty with sage philosophers is that while some of their insights may well be 
unique or clever, they may not seem like satisfactory answers either to traditional African or to 
Western questions.  For example, Rang'inya suggests that the reason people are mortal is to ease 
congestion in the world, and to make room for others (SP 127).  This statement alone, I suspect, 
would not be comforting to people pondering their own mortality and the possible meaning of 
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their brief lives.  Nor does it answer the questions so pressing in African traditional philosophy, 
such as why a particular person died at a particular time, in a particular way.19 It also does not 
explain why deaths occur in sparsely populated areas. Perhaps his remark is meant to encourage 
a certain attitude toward death, to encourage people to find solace in the well being of the 
community and not to cling, in futile fashion, to their own individual lives. Rang'inya's account is 
perhaps refreshing in its uniqueness and lightheartedness, but is it philosophically satisfactory, 
or even enlightening? 
D.  Was Oruka A Good Midwife? 
At this point I want to raise again the question of method.  Is Oruka's questioning a real 
case of Socratic midwifery?  Midwifery does not seem to be Oruka's singular method, and there 
is ambiguity in his descriptions.  At one point, while describing his method, Oruka laments that 
Plato had no tape recorder to interview Socrates.  His immediate point is that because of this, we 
can't be sure just what Socrates said or what Plato put into Socrates' mouth, a problem which is 
avoided in the careful method of sage philosophy.  In contrast, in the compiled summaries of 
ethnophilosophy or other philosophers, the reader is left out of the process and only shown the 
pre-sorted "results" (SP 41).  Apart from Oruka's lament, lovers of Plato might be greatly 
disappointed if instead of Plato's written Dialogues we had audiotapes of interviews undertaken 
by Socrates.  In the field of philosophy we expect interviewers to do more than just make a 
careful record.  We appreciate their evaluation of and commentary upon the thoughts of others 
whom they encounter.   
At different points in his essays, Oruka seems to reinforce one of the following explanations of 
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the function of the interviewer, and deny the other functions: 1.  the interviewer as careful 
recorder of what the sage says  (social science research mode); 2.  the interviewer as recorder as 
well as commentator and analyzer of the sage's views (Plato/ professional philosopher); 3.  The 
interviewer as midwife and provocateur of the sage's philosophical statements (Socrates). 
Which of these three modes characterizes Oruka's method most aptly?  From the texts of 
the interviews, I would argue that he most often engages in the first category of social science 
research.  He on occasion takes on the role of provocateur and even more rarely he engages in 
commentary on the sages' ideas beyond general praise—perhaps with good reason, considering 
the aforementioned difficulty in gaining the sages' cooperation.  For example, when a sage 
expresses views contrary to Oruka's own views on the equality of the sexes, Oruka does not take 
up the battle, as we would expect Socrates to do, until he has succeeded in changing the sage's 
view.  Rather, Oruka lets the sage speak his mind and then moves on to another topic (SP 113, 
121, 132).  Is this not the method of the careful social scientist? 
But on occasion, an intriguing account will encourage Oruka to ask a follow-up question 
that attempts to push the response past further description and into the realm of new ideas.  
Sometimes the sages themselves change or further specify their answers in the midst of their 
own account, spurred on just by the difficulty of clarifying their views.  For example, when Paul 
Mbuya Akoko is asked about freedom, he answers at first that freedom means free from 
restraint, the ability to do as one pleases.  When the interviewer asks whether all, or only a few, 
experience freedom, he answers at first that some people have more freedom than others.  But he 
admits, in the course of his description, that even the President's ability to act without constraint 
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is quite limited, and so he concludes that there is no complete freedom.  After prodding, he 
further ventures that one could, through wealth, ensure one's freedom, but he quickly notices that 
even the wealthy depend upon others and so are not free  (SP 143-44).  In other words, the sage 
was forced to clarify his own conception of freedom by scrutinizing whether or not the concept 
could be applied consistently in specific instances.   
Sometimes the repeated provocation of Oruka will lead to a blind alley.  For example, 
consider Oruka's interview with the Luhyia sage, Okemba Simiyu Chaungo.  Much of the 
interview is generated by a list of standard philosophical questions such as:  What is life?  What 
are good and evil?  What is truth?  What is happiness?  Such short and abstract questions draw 
an almost definitional response with some personalized insights.  But on one question, Oruka 
pursued Simiyu beyond the description given.  When Simiyu was describing his understanding 
that God gives some people (and not others) the gift of divining, Oruka pressed him to explain 
why God gives the gift only to some people.  On this question, however, Simiyu was stuck (SP 
111-12).  One recalls Cephalus, the successful old man in Plato's Republic, and how Socrates 
considers his account of justice to be inadequate.  Cephalus himself admits that he can pursue 
the question of justice no further.  But it is also interesting how Cephalus does not seem to have 
his ego invested in his ability to answer Socrates's questions adequately.  In Plato's account, 
Cephalus says to his son Polemarchus and to his friends:  "Oh well... I hand over the word to you 
people; it is high time now for me to see after the sacred rites."20 
I cannot help getting the same impression from some of Oruka's interviews.  The sages 
are self-confident in their perception of themselves as important and busy people who have 
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graciously spared some time for Oruka and his questions; but they will not be haunted by their 
inability to provide answers to all of a series of abstract questions.  In fact, this raises the issue 
whether it is even appropriate to subject sages to such questioning.  What guarantee do we have 
that such questioning will bring out the best of the wisdom of those being interviewed?  Would 
not observing them go about the daily practices that have earned them respect for possessing 
wisdom perhaps give us a more accurate account?  If they are medicine men, how do they 
consult the sick?  How do they practice their craft?  If they are diviners, how do they ascertain 
the future?  What consultation methods do they use?  This knowledge would constitute a lived 
philosophy.   
But Socrates would hardly have been satisfied with lived and practiced crafts of 
"wisdom" that could not be articulated.  After all, he was not satisfied with the Athenian poets 
who could not, during questioning, explain in words how poetry differs from other forms of 
language.  Like diviners, they "say many fine things but do not understand what they say"; rather 
, they depend on "natural genius and inspiration."21  In fact, there is a parallel between Appiah’s 
and Socrates' frustration, as Appiah is not satisfied with the Ghanian priest who knows all of the 
proper rituals, without knowing why any particular thing must be done in that fashion.22   
Unlike many others, Oruka's colleague D.A. Masolo takes it upon himself to criticize 
individual sages as well as to cast doubt on the philosophical nature of Oruka's method in 
African Philosophy in Search of an Identity. Masolo criticizes Paul Mbuya's statements on the 
equality of men and women, not because they lack truth or rationality, but rather because they are 
mere statements of common sense "without much of the usual elaboration that often goes with 
PRESBEY  AFRICAN SAGE PHILOSOPHY AND SOCRATES: MIDWIFERY AND METHOD 
 
21 
 
 
philosophic exposition."23  Masolo wonders whether Oruka is willing to call philosophical any 
statement of opinion which is clever or non-mediocre.  Because of the weakness of Oruka's 
examples, Masolo charges that the sages are not philosophers.  He adds that "Afrocentric 
interests are not a sufficient reason for asking readers to accept African wise men and women as 
philosophers,"24 and he suggests that Oruka has been too pleased with too little evidence just 
because it fits into his overall political project of challenging Eurocentric notions of philosophy.  
V. THE SAGE PHILOSOPHY PROJECT: WHAT REMAINS? 
A. Is Socratic Practice a Valid Standard? 
After all of this criticism of the content of the sages’ views, what can be said in defense 
of the practice of sage philosophy and in defense of the embattled sages themselves? 
I think that some of the harsh criticism dished out to the sages interviewed is due to the 
model of Socratic dialogue itself.  Was Socrates fair in the way he criticized his verbal 
opponents?  In his book The Trial of Socrates, I.F. Stone suggests that the "negative dialectic" 
that became Socrates's favorite method tended to ridicule respected people in Athenian society 
because they could not come up with accurate definitions for their ideas.  Given the lack of such 
definitions, which even he himself could not provide, Socrates concluded that most great men in 
Athens knew "little or nothing."25  Stone accuses Socrates of gross oversimplifications.  
Certainly, community leaders should be those "who know"—but who know what?  They should 
know enough to lead their communities wisely.  Stone says that for Socrates, "the man `who 
knows' had to be a professional philosopher. His `knowledge' had to be a specialized 
metaphysical figment."26  But no one, including philosophers, could be said to possess real 
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epistemological knowledge in this narrow sense of the term.  Stone suggests that the practical, 
working knowledge of the wise men of Athens was overlooked or devalued by Socrates's 
method. 
Certainly, as was noted earlier, Oruka's goal is not to debunk the sages.  Their beliefs 
might be easily debunked by philosophers trained in the tradition of Socrates's "negative 
dialectic."  But I suggest that this would entail selling the tradition short.  In these interviews the 
sages appear out of their context, and hence their lived wisdom does not shine forth best in such 
settings.  If the job really is to record and preserve the best of a wisdom tradition, it must be done 
by methods not so foreign to the sages' lives. 
B.  The Sages as Midwives 
It could be that in their original context, the sages serve as midwives of others.  A person 
with a reputation for wisdom is often called upon for advice.  When people come to tell the sage 
their troubles, that sage might try to elicit information, and perhaps a solution, from the person.  
Additionally, the use of proverbs often seems intended to encourage a person to search out a 
meaning for themselves; a sage would not say "the meaning of the proverb is this, and so you 
should do this...."  In this way the use of proverbs was Socratic insofar as it challenged these 
people to see for themselves, instead of having answers handed to them on a silver platter.  By 
Oruka asking all of the questions, we do not have a chance to see what kind of questions the sage 
would like to ask people, and so we do not see the sage in his or her Socratic role.  It could also 
be that the subject matter of interest would change if the sages themselves were in charge of the 
topics.   As it is, the topics reflect the standard interests of Western philosophy.  
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Although I have focused in this paper on Oruka's modeling of the interviewer on Socrates 
in his role as midwife, in many places Oruka states that the sage is like Socrates.  Although 
Oruka is not commenting in such passages on the sage's use of Socratic midwifery, he does draw 
parallels between some of Socrates's other characteristics and those of the sages.  For example, 
he suggests that the sages are "as reflective as Socrates was" (TCAP 30). 
This interest in Socrates as a model or point of comparison for the African sage shows 
itself during Oruka's conversation with his colleague, Chaungo Barasa, whom Oruka also 
regarded as a sage.  Barasa, who has had some exposure to the practice of Western philosophy, 
claims that in every society there are some few special people (although Barasa is quick to 
explain that they are not "superior") who feel especially inclined to mental exercises, and who 
feel "the craving to enlighten society about the rationale behind various values of their society 
(SP 149).”  As an example of this kind of person Barasa gives both Socrates and the Bukusu 
spiritual leader Masinde.  An additional parallel between Masinde and Socrates, in Barasa's 
opinion, is the fact that each claimed to be a messenger of the gods, sent to be a "gadfly" in order 
to lead their communities to a life of wisdom. 
We could ask some skeptical questions about Barasa's parallel.  It is true that Socrates 
said he was sent by the gods, but not with a special message to relay, as other prophetic 
messengers from God have done.  He was sent by the god in order to free others from their false 
claims to knowledge, even if it means leaving them, at least temporarily, empty-handed.  Is this 
the kind of messenger Masinde was?  If it were only a case of meeting Oruka's definition of 
caring about the ethics of their society, then surely Socrates and Masinde have that in common—
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but how much else is in common? 
VI. CONCLUSION: SAGACITY AND PHILOSOPHICAL REASON   
We can find in Oruka's works a careful description of what it means to be a sage, and the 
importance of sagacity.  I have already covered the way in which Oruka points out the need for a 
sage to be philosophical in the critical and reflective sense.  But Oruka also insists that 
philosophers must be sagacious.  In his introduction to Sage Philosophy, he insists that the 
philosopher's tools of analysis and criticism are empty without the sage's gift for intuition.  While 
both the philosopher and sage need insights, the sage usually "earns high marks" in insight 
compared to the "common run" of analytic philosophers.  In addition, the sage has both insight 
and ethical inspiration (SP 9).  Some sages are philosophers, but in his estimation many 
philosophers are not sages, for they may love arguments without caring for the well-being of the 
society.  Following from this distinction, he suggests that Socrates is best understood as a sage, 
because he "used philosophy only as a means to advance his sagacity and expose the hypocrisies 
of his time" (SP 10).  In order to strengthen his argument, he quotes Richard Bell, who concurs 
that Socrates should be regarded as a sage, or a "sagacious philosopher" (SP 6).  In this 
description, sages are seen as better than the mere philosophers insofar as the sages are 
concerned with the ethical well-being of society. 
It is important to point out that Oruka in general wants all philosophers, including those 
with an academic Western training, to care about improving the ethics of their societies.  
Professional philosophers can ideally be like Socrates in their quest for a more just Africa.  At 
this point we can conclude that while sages are distinguished from mere philosophers by their 
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commitment to society's betterment in a moral sense, Oruka has at the same time suggested that 
philosophy without this sagacious commitment to living well is empty technique. 
In conclusion, Oruka's description of sages and philosophers is normative in that he 
charts a course for philosophers to take in Africa in this century.  I think Oruka's contrasts of 
philosophers and sages could be described in the following categories: (1)  mere sages are 
concerned with ethical norms but uncritical of traditions and unreflective; (2) mere philosophers 
are technical and critical analysts divorced from concerns of the well-being of society; (3) 
philosophic sages are insightful, traditional wise persons who are reflectively critical and 
committed to society's well being; and (4) sagacious philosophers are professional philosophers 
whose  practice of their discipline is not divorced from the needs and concerns of members of 
their society and humanity at  large. 
The first two categories are more limited in their worth than the last two, those that 
combine sagacity and philosophy.  Oruka has therefore charted a normative course for the 
practice of philosophy in Africa and elsewhere.  Oruka's efforts have tried to bridge the gap 
between the academic and the illiterate and between tradition and modernity in order to find a 
common rallying point for the efforts of a popular philosophy, a "wisdom" to be sought by young 
and old alike, in dialogue with all members of the community.  He has found a project for 
philosophy that would make it an integral part of the community and culture rather than an 
academic exercise imported from European textbooks.  Just as it could be argued in the West 
that an adequate rendering of Socrates entails applying the concepts to contemporary dilemmas, 
so also Oruka has done the same for Africa:  he has enthused many academics and has 
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encouraged them to seek out and dialogue with others in their communities, in pursuit of the 
applied knowledge that we call wisdom.  Philosophy is done in the streets and not only in 
conference centers.  And so it is perhaps appropriate that, despite the serious shortcomings of his 
midwifery and his method, Oruka goes off the beaten path to rural villages to find his sages 
involved in philosophical speculation and analysis of the events of their communities.27  
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